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John MacCormick*

The Animal Protection Commission:
Advancing Social Membership for Animals
through a Novel Administrative Agency

If the state sought to improve law's treatment of nonhuman animals, what form
should its intervention take? This paper questions the assumption that the state
would have to choose between incremental welfare reforms and an immediate
transition to animal personhood. Drawing on Martha Nussbaum's capabilities
theory and on Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's political approach to animal
rights, it argues that the focus should be on how the relationship between
human and nonhuman animals can be improved. It suggests that the state could
intervene by creating an administrative agency with just this task; and that it could
look to labour boards and human rights commission for inspiration. The paper
draws comparisons with animal protection agencies in countries such as Austria,
Switzerland and New Zealand, and argues that an agency with both regulatory
and adjudicative functions could be developed out of Nova Scotia's current
animal protection legislation.

Si I'Etatcherche a ameliorer le traitement des animaux non humains par la Ioi, quelle
forme devrait prendre son intervention ? Le present document remet en question
I'hypothese selon laquelle I'Etat devrait choisir entre des reformes progressives
du bien-6tre social et une transition immediate vers I'etat de personne animale.
S'appuyant sur la theorie des capacites de Martha Nussbaum et sur I'approche
politique de Sue Donaldson et Will Kymlicka en matiere de droits des animaux,
il soutient que /'accent devrait 6tre mis sur la maniere d'ameliorer la relation
entre les animaux humains et non humains. II laisse entendre que I'Etat pourrait
intervenir en creant un organisme administratif charge precisement de cette tOche
et qu'il pourrait s inspirer des commissions du travail et des droits de la personne.
Le document etablit des comparaisons avec les organismes de protection des
animaux de pays comme lAutriche, la Suisse et la Nouvelle-Zelande, et soutient
qu'un organisme dote de fonctions reglementaires et decisionnelles pourrait 6tre
cree a partir de la legislation actuelle de la Nouvelle-Ecosse sur la protection des
animaux.

*
JD, Schulich School of Law (2019). This paper was awarded second prize in the competition for
the 2018 J.S.D. Tory Award for legal writing. The authorwould like to thank Jodi Lazare and Vaughan
Black for their advice and encouragement and for many enlightening discussions on the subject of
animals and the law.
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Introduction
This paper proposes a novel administrative agency with the purpose of
fostering a better relationship between human and nonhuman animals.
This proposal is incremental in that it is meant to grow out of existing
welfare-oiented provincial laws but radical in that it provides for the
representation of animal interests before the agency and their adjudication
against those of entrenched animal-use industries. Drawing on the work
of Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka and that of Martha Nussbaum, it is
motivated by a relational theory of animal ethics aimed at allowing animals
to actualize their capabilities within a shared human-animal society. At
the same time, it is tempered by the recognition that such a society could
only gradually emerge out of changes in public opinion and negotiations
between opposing interests. The proposed agency looks to human rights
commissions and labour boards as agencies that facilitate these very
processes within human society, while also drawing on promising models
from countries seen as world leaders in animal protection law, such as
Austria, Switzerland and New Zealand.
The paper has three parts. The first part sets out the philosophical
motivations for this project and explains why a capability-oriented,
relational approach to animal law can help to resolve the impasse in the
ethical debate between animal welfare and animals rights, and the related
opposition, on the legal level, between property and personhood status for
animals. The second part sketches the outlines of a proposal for a provincial
administrative agency with the purpose of advancing capabilities for
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nonhumans. The third and final part elaborates on that proposal and shows
how it could grow out of the current AnimalProtectionAct in Nova Scotia.1
I.

PhilosophicalFoundations

1. Animal capabilities:beyond rights and welfare
The animal advocacy movement is polarized by a now-familiar debate
between "animal rights" and "animal welfare." 2 Partisans of animal
welfare hold that the movement should focus, not on eliminating the
exploitation of nonhumans by humans-whether because they think this
exploitation isjustified, or because they think that it isfutile to oppose
it, at least for now-but rather on mitigating, to the extent possible, the
conditions under which exploited animals live and die. Proponents of
animal rights, by contrast, hold that any exploitation of nonhuman animals
is unjustified, no matter how "humane," and that welfare-oriented reforms
are at best beside the point and at worst counterproductive. The animal
welfare perspective is a consequentialist approach, in that it permits a
reckoning of the aggregate benefits and harms of a given course of action,
while the animal rights perspective is non-consequentialist, in that it holds
that overall utility does not justify overriding fundamental entitlements.3
On an ethical level, rights and welfare offer a stark and unwinnable
choice. Consequentialist welfare approaches are not serious enough about
individual animal lives, in that they authorize fundamental deprivations as
long as an overall accounting comes up in their favour.' By a fallacious
multiplication of utility, consequentialism makes each reform seem more
significant than it is: if each cage gets just one square centimetre bigger,
the gain to each animal is tiny, but if this gain in multiplied by the millions
of animals in cages, it starts to seem very important. This kind of reasoning
is misleading in that, by focussing on the aggregate, it attempts to evade
the insignificance of the gain at the individual level, where the privation is
really felt. If every homeless person were given a scarf, we would still not
be justified in saying we had made real progress in improving the plight of
1.

Animal ProtectionAct, SNS 2008, c 33.

2.

For the outlines of this debate, see Cass R Sunstein, "Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?"

in Cass R Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum, eds, Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); for a critical perspective, see Peter Sankoff, "The Animal
Rights Debate and the Expansion of Public Discourse: Is It Possible for the Law Protecting Animals
to Simultaneously Fail and Succeed?" (2012) 18:2 Animal L 281 at 283-285.

3. On the distinction between consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches in animal
ethics, see Tom Regan, The Casefor Animal Rights, updated ed (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2004) at 141-142.

4.
See Martha C Nussbaum, "Beyond 'Compassion and Humanity': Justice for Nonhuman
Animals" in Sunstein & Nussbaum, supra note 2, 299 at 302-305 [Nussbaum, "Beyond 'Compassion
and Humanity"'].
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the homeless-no matter how many people were made just the smallest bit
better off Such solutions, which are meaningless when measured against
the scale of the problems, risk promoting public complacency, offering as
they do the false impression that the problems are being addressed.'
Rights-based approaches are serious about individual animals, but
they suffer from other problems. Recognizing the inviolability of animal
rights gives each person a reason not to harm animals (or, by means
of contract, have them harmed in his or her name), which furnishes an
argument for personal veganism.6 The force of these arguments should not
be discounted, but absent a wildly successful effort at public persuasion,
personal veganism is not enough to effect social change. To be vegan is to
be a conscientious objector in a one-sided war waged by humans against
nonhumans. However, unless the number of conscientious objectors
dramatically increases, their mere presence will not on its own be enough
to stop the war. Perhaps even more critically, because non-consequentialist
approaches preclude an overall assessment of harms and benefits, they
make it difficult to think about degrees of improvement in the condition
of animals or about progress toward an overall social goal. On the societal
level, an imperative against the violation of animal rights will often yield
prescriptions that are too inflexible to apply in the world as we know it,
particularly since they leave little room for second-best solutions.
The capabilities approach as developed by Martha Nussbaum offers a
solution to these problems. The capabilities approach is a unified theory
that can apply to humans and nonhumans with built-in variations across
species. It is built on the idea that it is good when a creature can flourish
by living actively in accordance with the kind of thing that it is. Nussbaum
writes: "Intuitively, it seems to me that the idea of doing injustice to an
animal makes sense in much the way that the idea of doing injustice to a
human being makes sense: both can experience pain and harm, and both
are attempting to live and act, projects that can be wrongly thwarted. The
notion of justice is conceptually bound up with the idea of experienced
harm and thwarting, or so I believe."' On the capabilities approach, a

5. For an argument that incremental welfare reforms really do little for animals and may even make
their expoloitation more efficient, see Gary L Francione & Anna E Charlton, "Animal Law: A Proposal
for a New Direction" in Anne Peters, Saskia Stucki & Livia Boscardin, eds, Animal Law: Reform or
Revolution? (Zirich: Schultess, 2015) 33.
6.
The view that personal veganism is central to any meaningful animal advocacy movement is
associated especially with Gary Francione. See Gary Francione, "The Paradigm Shift Requires Clarity
about the Moral Baseline: Veganism,"AnimalRights: TheAbolitionistApproach,online: <http://www.
abolitionistapproach.com/the-pamdigm-shift-requires-clarity-about-the-moml-baseline-veganism/>.
7.

Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge,

Mass: Belknap, 2011) at 158-159 [Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities].
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being's capacities for action, and its attempt to realize those capacities,
gives it inherent worth and an entitlement to justice. For Nussbaum, "The
notion of dignity is closely related to the idea of active striving."8
At the same time, Nussbaum's notion of the "tragic choice" allows for
meaningful second-best solutions. This is the regrettable choice that must
be made, against the claims ofjustice, in situations where it is simply not
possible for capabilities to be realized according to the dignity of each
being. Unlike consequentialism, the notion of the tragic choice recognizes
that fundamental entitlements are violated when such a choice is madeand that that is a bad thing. As Nussbaum writes, "The situation of tragic
choice is not fully captured in standard cost-benefit analysis: the violation
of an entitlement grounded in basic justice is not just a large cost; it is
a cost of a distinctive sort, one that in a fully just society no person has
to bear."9 The capabilities approach is non-consequentialist in that the
aggregate consequences of a course of action are not enough to make it
desirable-if anything, they justify the act under the threat of something
worse.
By countenancing the inevitability of tragic choices, the capabilities
approach recognizes that real situations of genuine conflict will arise.
In the case of nonhuman animals, they could have to do with disease
research or the need to maintain a global food supply.1" Nussbaum does
not offer a comprehensive method for resolving these conflicts, and this
is in keeping with the tendency of Aristotelianism (an important source
of the capabilities approach) and ancient philosophy generally to leave
a lot to be determined on a situational basis.1" Virtues like compassion
will probably be part of the answer, along with certain civic virtues that
promote deliberation and justice. The proposal put forward here is meant
to promote this kind of deliberation.
Nussbaum's capabilities approach combines Aristotelian and Stoic
elements to articulate a comprehensive theory of the good for both humans
and nonhumans. It takes from Stoicism the idea of equal and intrinsic
worth, and interprets it in light of an Aristotelian focus on life and activity
in contrast to the Stoic obsession with rationality. Aristotelian ethics,
like ancient ethics generally, is more flexible than rights theory, in that
it attends to the nuances of particular situations, but is more interested in
fundamental values than consequentialism, in that happiness and flourishing

8.
9.

Ibid at 31.
Ibid at 37.

10.

Nussbaum, "Beyond 'Compassion and Humanity,"' supra note 4 at 318.

11.

Ibid at 306.
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characterize individuals, not aggregates.12 However, neither Aristotle nor
Nussbaum makes the mistake of thinking about individuals in splendid
isolation from the societies in which they live. In contrast to Stoicism,
13
Aristotelianism accepts the importance of circumstances to flourishing.
Moreover, Stoicism's insistence that happiness is possible in every
circumstance hangs on its devotion to the central importance of rationality.
If rationality is rejected as the fundamental criterion of worth-as really it
must be if animals are to be part of the moral community-Stoic disregard
for circumstances, which stands with the unique importance accorded to
rationality, must also fall with it. To promote animal flourishing, we must
attend to the political conditions that make it possible.
2. Interspecies relations:beyond property andpersonhood
Much as the sphere of animal ethics is divided by the line between rights and
welfare, the sphere of animal law advocacy is divided by the line between
property and personhood. The property-personhood dichotomy, like the
rights-versus-welfare debate, is focussed on the fundamental entitlements
of animals, or their intrinsic moral and legal status. Important as this kind
of inquiry is, it does not effectively address the pressing political and legal
question of how humans should structure their relationship to nonhuman
animals.
A political approach to the animal question is important to animal law
for the reason that it focuses on just this question. This is why some model
like the one that Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka propose in Zoopoliswhich uses citizenship theory to analyze the relationship of nonhuman
animals to the polity, and calls for consideration of animal interests in
questions of the public good-must be right. 4 Whether or not we think
in terms of citizenship, we should be focussing on the place of animals
in society and on how our political decisions affect them. This is a real
question of practical ethics which is open to discussion at the social or
political level.
A political approach to animal law is a natural fit for a capabilityoriented account of why animals matter, since the capabilities approach
carries with it an interest in how political conditions contribute to the
12.

See Nussbaum's discussion of the classical sources of her version of the capabilities approach,

CreatingCapabilities,supra note 7 at 125-13 1.
13. This is a focus of Nussbaum's own work in Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy ofDesire: Theory
and Practicein Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), especially Chs 2, 3,
9& 10.
14. Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis:A PoliticalTheory ofAnimal Rights (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2011). In what follows, I am also drawing on Will Kymlicka, "Social Membership:
Animal Law beyond the Property/Personhood Impasse" (2017) 40:1 Dal LJ 123.
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flourishing (or otherwise) of individuals. Affiliation is one ofthe ten central
capabilities for both humans and nonhumans which Nussbaum situates
at the heart of her approach, and this includes an explicitly political and
relational dimension:
[Nonhuman animals] are entitled to relations with humans, where humans
enter the picture, that are rewarding and reciprocal, rather than tyrannical.
At the same time, they are entitled to live in a world public culture that
respects them and treats them as dignified beings. This entitlement does
not just mean protecting them from instances of humiliation that they
will feel as painful. The capabilities approach here extends more broadly
than utilitarianism, holding that animals are entitled to world policies
that grant them political rights and the legal status of dignified beings,
whether they understand that status or not.'5
An important part of the reason animal flourishing is thwarted in society
as we know it is that humans have ordered their society in a way that does
not accord them a dignified place within it.
This approach is part of relational theory. Jennifer Nedelsky, a leading
relational theorist explains that a relational approach to law should inform
human beings' relationship with beings that are not human: "The relational
approach would ask how human actions are currently structuring patterns
of relations among the diverse entities of our world and where these can be
easily identified as harmful. [...] The project would be to try to discern how
human action could have as positive (or as minimal) an impact as possible
while fostering wise relations between humans (both individuals and in
the aggregate) and the other entities, broadly conceived."16 Donaldson and
Kymlicka, too, are explicit about the relational quality of their theory. 7
This helps to situate the approach to animal law set out here within a
broader theoretical approach to law in general. What bears emphasis in
this context, however, is not the importance of being relational, but the
importance of being practical. The relational approach helps us to rephrase
the animal question in the active voice: thinking about how we as a society
should relate to animals does more to guide action than thinking about
what, in the abstract, animals are owed.
A relational approach to animal law helps us to go beyond nowtraditional dichotomies of the animal advocacy movement. The difficulty
of achieving personhood for nonhuman animals can make it seem as if
incremental welfare reforms were the only viable option, while the failure

15.

Nussbaum, "Beyond 'Compassion and Humanity,"' supra note 4 at 316.

16.
17.

Jennifer Nedelsky, Law sRelations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 196.
Zoopolis, supra note 14 at 207.
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of welfare reforms to achieve meaningful change for animals makes
personhood seem like the only legitimate goal. The dilemma is unworkable
because there are such strong arguments against either alternative.18 In
contrast, the question of how humans should relate to nonhumans is much
more open-ended, leaving greater room for creativity and, it is to be hoped,
more productive legal and political debate.
This is especially important if a focus of animal advocates is to be
on bringing animals and animal issues into the public discourse, as Peter
Sankoff has suggested.19 A benefit of this approach is that it stands to win
the support of both rights and welfare partisans within the animal advocacy
movement. A penchant for principled infighting has long been one of the
movement's weaknesses, and yet any of its factions would surely be glad
to see the debate about nonhuman animals taking place among a broad
section of society, rather than a small and comparatively isolated group of
activists .2

In short, rather than pursuing incremental welfare reforms or holding
out for inviolable animal rights, animal-oriented law reform efforts should
aim to improve human-nonhuman relationships in ways that enhance
animal capabilities. In redesigning their legal relationship with animals,
humans must start with something more effective than welfare reforms,
but an immediate transition to nonhuman animal personhood is a nonstarter. What animal advocates need is effective measures for fostering
societal change.
II. The Animal Protection Commission
As Gregory Smulewicz-Zucker has convincingly argued, only the state
has the power to intervene effectively in the human-animal relationship.2"
The animal exploitation industry has power and money, and so far it has
had the state's cooperation.22 As long as both industry and the state are
aligned against animals, there is little hope for meaningful reform: since

18.

Cf Sankoff, supra note 2 at 287-288.

19.

Sankoff, supra note 2.

20. On the need for a broader, more inclusive animal advocacy movement and greater public
deliberation, see also Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka, "Make It So: Envisioning a Zoopolitical
Revolution" in Paola Cavalieri, ed, Philosophy and the Politics of Animal Liberation (New York:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 71.
21. Gregory Smulewicz-Zucker, "Bringing the State into Animal Rights Politics" in Cavalieri, ibid,
239.
22. In the Canadian context, see John Sorenson, "Some Strange Things Happening in Our Country:

Opposing Proposed Changes in Anti-Cruelty Laws in Canada" (2003) 12:3 Soc & Leg Stud 377;
on the equally bleak picture in the USA, see David J Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, "Foxes in the
Henhouse: Animals, Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modem American Fable" in Sunstein& Nussbaum,
supra note 2, 205.
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the animal exploitation industry has little incentive to improve the plight
of animals on its own, it is to the state that animal advocates must turn.
To this end, it is worth asking: if the state did decide to intervene to make
the legal relationship between humans and nonhumans more just, what
measures would it make sense for the state to adopt?
Were nonhumans to be granted the rights of natural persons, the change
would be so dramatic and wide-ranging that it is hard to imagine how it
could come about immediately. Moreover, if, as Kymlicka suggests, we
take the number of vegans in the population as a quick proxy-on the
plausible assumption that a commitment to animal personhood seems to
entail an obligation to renounce animal products, or at least to stop eating
animals-it seems like there is just not nearly enough support for a move
like that to make it happen.23 Even if personhood really is in reach for
chimpanzees, elephants or cetaceans, it is far, far away for cattle, pigs
and chickens.24 At the same time, Jonathan Lovvorn, while supplying
statistics that are hardly more encouraging as far as the prospect of animal
personhood is concerned, notes that there is widespread public support
for some degree of change to the way the law treats nonhuman animals."
This lends both legitimacy and an air of reality to the prospect of state
intervention.
Despite the substantial obstacles to personhood status for nonhumans,
there may be more the state can do to adjust the human-nonhuman
relationship, beyond mere welfare-oriented reforms. For inspiration we
should consider the solutions that the state has chosen when, in the fairly
recent past, it has intervened to correct injustice in existing relationships.
Two prominent examples are labour boards and human rights commissions.
Could a specialized administrative agency play a similar role in adjusting
the relationship between humans and nonhumans? What follows is an
argument that it could.
Like most of Canada's animal protection schemes, such an agency
would be a matter of provincial jurisdiction. This is largely because

23.

Kymlicka noted that the number is estimated to be 1 or 2% of the population in most Western

countries: Will Kymlicka, "Social membership," supra note 14 at 131. The results of a recent
Dalhousie University survey suggest that 2.3 per cent of Canadians are vegan and 7.1 per cent are
vegetarian, with numbers significantly higher in the under-35 age group: Sylvain Charlebois, "Young
Canadians lead the charge to a meatless Canada," The Conversation (14 March 2018), online: <https:/
theconversation.com/young-canadians-lead-the-charge-to-a-meatless-canada-93225>.
24. In mentioning the prospect of personhood for the "highest" species of animals, I am of course
thinking of the work of Steven Wise and the Nonhuman Rights Project, online: <nonhumanrights.
org>.
25. Jonathan Loworn, "Animal Law in Action: The Law, Public Perception, and the Limits of
Animal Rights Theory as a Basis for Legal Reform" (2006) 12 Animal L 133 at 136-138.
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nonhuman animals are property under the law, so that laws governing
human treatment of nonhumans are a matter of property and civil rights.26
This paper envisions such an agency as it might come to exist in Nova
Scotia, but of course any province could implement the idea.
In fact, Nova Scotia's animal protection legislation already includes
an administrative tribunal, namely the Animal Cruelty Appeals Board,
which currently exists under the Animal Protection Act.2 The mandate
of the Animal Cruelty Appeals Board, however, is starkly circumscribed:
it merely reviews decisions to seize an animal in distress at the request
of an "owner or custodian of an animal who considers himself or
herself aggrieved" thereby.28 Limited as this function is, it could grow
into something more robust. The Board, even as constituted at present,
is effectively tasked with deciding what is and is not acceptable in the
conduct of humans toward nonhumans, insofar as it decides what human
behaviour warrants the state's protective intervention. For now, however,
the Board's mandate is principally concerned with the legitimacy of the
state's decision in individual cases to limit, through the operation of animal
protection legislation, the private rights of ownership that are normally
enforced against animals. The agency proposed here would have a much
wider mandate, namely to begin restructuring the human-nonhuman
relationship in such a way as to promote animal capabilities.
Such an agency might be styled the "Animal Protection Commission."
The term "animal protection" is neutral between animal welfare and
animal rights. Compared to "animal welfare," "animal protection" seems
to imply more active duties toward animals, which is in keeping with
the proposal to focus on society's obligations toward nonhumans. At the
same time, while "animal protection" does not imply that animals have
rights, it is hard to deny that animals with rights will still need protection.29
Moreover, the fact that the term is consistent with the name given to the
current statutory framework in Nova Scotia could help to emphasize the
continuity between existing law and the proposal made here.30

26.

ConstitutionAct, 1867 (UK) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix 11, No 5, s

92(13).
27.

Animal ProtectionAct, supra note 1, s 31(1).

28. Ibid, ss31(1), 32(1).
29. The expression corresponds to the German word Tierschutz, and it could be noted in this
connection that German-speaking countries, as a bloc, have perhaps the world's strongest animal
protection laws, all of which are called Tierschutzgesetze. (See the World Animal Protection Index,
online: <api.worldanimalprotectionaorg>, which gives a grade of A to Austria and Switzerland and
a grade of B to Germany. The other two A's go to the UK and New Zealand. Canada, like the USA,
receives a grade of D.)
30.

Animal ProtectionAct, supra note 1.
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For reasons to be explained shortly, an agency with these goals might
be structured to include the following: a Commissioner authorized to
receive complaints and to work with humans suspected of violating the
act and help them to achieve compliance; an Interspecies Relations Board
authorized to conduct investigations and hearings, to be composed of the
Commissioner or her deputy and an equal number of representatives of
animal use and animal advocacy groups; and a Prolocutor for Nonhuman
Animals authorized to bring complaints before the Commission and to
represent the interests of nonhuman animals at hearings before the Board.
The role of the Commission would be both regulatory and, through the
activities of the Board, adjudicative. So constituted, the Commission would
advance animal protection by providing a forum for the renegotiation of
the human-nonhuman relationship. The following sections explain how the
design of a Commission to accomplish this goal is modelled on existing
institutions both in Canada and abroad.
1. The Commission
Human rights commissions provide a valuable example, because they
too were designed to restructure relationships. The purposes of the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Commission, which include a mission "to ensure that
every individual in the Province is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy
a full and productive life and that failure to provide equality of opportunity
threatens the status of all persons," clearly align it with the goal of human
capability development.3 1 As a model for the proposed agency, it is worth
considering the duties that Nova Scotia's Human Rights Act assigns to the
Human Rights Commission:
24 (1) The Commission shall
(a) administer and enforce the provisions of this Act;
(b) develop a program of public infornation and education in the
field of human rights to forward the principle that every person
is free and equal in dignity and rights without regard to race,
religion, creed, colour or ethnic or national origin;
(c) conduct research and encourage research by universities and
other bodies in the general field of human rights;
(d) advise and assist government departments and co-ordinate
their activities as far as these activities concern human rights;
(e) advise the Government on suggestions, recommendations and
requests made by private organizations and individuals;
(f) co-operate with and assist any person, organization or body
concerned with human rights, within or outside the Province;
(g) report as required by the Minister on the business and activities
31.

Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989, c 214, s 2(e).
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of the Commission; and
(h) consider, investigate or administer any matter or activity
referred to the Commission by the Governor in Council or the
Minister.32
A provision just like this one outlining the duties of the Animal Protection
Commission could be included in the Animal ProtectionAct, with "animal
protection" replacing "human rights", and "the pursuit of a dignified
existence for all creatures" replacing "the principle that every person,
etc." Because the purpose of this agency is to promote the enhancement
of animal capabilities by fostering societal change, the educational
component would be especially central to its mandate.
A novel administrative agency like this one could help to actualize
animal capabilities within society by enforcing capability-enhancing laws
in a way that combines education with sanctions for wrongdoing (like a
human rights commission) and facilitates negotiation when conflicting
interests are at stake (like a labour board). Administrative agencies are
an appropriate vehicle for delivering basic entitlements, like the right to
equality or the freedom of association, where constitutions do not apply
because the relevant claims are between private parties. The agency
could, moreover, be designed in a way that enhances human capabilities
as well as those of nonhumans. It should, for instance, conduct research
into and promote alternatives for those whose livelihood might be affected
by animal-friendly change. A provincial agency is a good place for
experimental innovations, and the relative autonomy of administrative
agencies gives them more opportunity to implement relational and
capabilities-based approaches than the general courts.33
2. The Prolocutorfor Nonhuman Animals
The effectiveness of this scheme depends on its incorporation of an
advocate for animal interests. Ours is an adversarial system, and the
expectation is that the Animal Protection Commission would operate on a
similar basis: for this to be possible, someone would need to represent the
side of the nonhumans. The advocate who plays this role might be styled
the "Prolocutor for Nonhuman Animals," literally meaning the person
who speaks on their behalf
Other jurisdictions have already developed their own versions of
such an office. The most prominent is the Austrian example, in which the
federal animal protection law requires each Land or province to appoint

32.

Ibid, s 24(1).

33.

Bruce P Archibald, "The Significance of the Systemic Relative Autonomy of Labour Law"

(2017) 40:1 Dal U 1 at 21-23, 29-44.

Advancing Social Membership forAnimals
through a Novel Administrative Agency

265

an animal protection ombudsperson (Tierschutzombudsperson).3 The
ombudsperson is automatically a party to proceedings under the act,
and has the duty of representing the interests of animal protection.35 The
ombudsperson must be a person trained in veterinary medicine, zoology
or agricultural sciences, with additional training in animal protection.36
The Swiss Canton of Zirich also provides for the representation of animal
interests by a lawyer from the cantonal government: until 2011, there was
a dedicated Tieranwalt,or animal lawyer, employed forjust this purpose.3"
Donaldson and Kymlicka, though expressing interest in Ztirich's
Tieranwaltin particular, offer an appropriate caution: "[T]his is more about
ensuring the effective enforcement of existing legal protections against
cruelty and harm than about political representation. The animal advocate
is not authorized to renegotiate the terms of membership by representing
animals as co-citizens in legislative processes." 38 This, however, is
another reason why Austria's Tierschutzombudspersonen are interesting.
The same animal protection law also provides for two advisory bodies.
The ombudspersons of the nine provinces belong to the Tierschutzrat, or
Animal Protection Council, along with representatives of government,
agriculture, veterinary medicine and academia. This body is charged with
submitting opinions on draft regulations made under the act, as well as
with producing an annual report with recommendations on advancing
animal protection law. 39 This is in addition to the Tierschutzkommission
(Animal Protection Commission), which is a cross-party parliamentary
working group, which must make its own report to Parliament every two
years.4"
Unlike Austria's Tierschutzombudspersonen, but like Ztirich's
Tieranwalt, the Prolocutor should be a lawyer specializing in nonhuman
animals, rather than a veterinarian (though the commission should of
course have recourse to veterinarians when evidence about animal
bodies is required). The role of the Prolocutor is that of an advocate,
not a physician. Lawyers are much better placed to serve this function.
34. Tierschutzgesetz [Animal ProtectionLaw] [TSchG], BGB1I 118/2004 §41(1), translation online:
<https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV 2004 1 118/ERV 2004 1 118.pdf>.
35. TSchG, ibid, §41(3), (4).
36. TSchG, ibid, §41(2).
37. Kantonales Tierschutzgesetz [Cantonal Animal Protection Law] (Zirich), 554.1/1991 §17.

Leo Hickman, "The Lawyer who defends animals," The Guardian (5 March 2010), online: <www.
guardian.com/world/2010/mar/05/lawyer-wo-defends-animals>; "Amtsjuristin ersetzt Tieranwalt"
["Government jurist replaces animal lawyer"], Der Tagesanzeiger (23 December 2010), online:
<www.tagesanzeiger.ch/zuerich/region/Amtsjuristin-ersetzt-Tiemnwaltl/story/26088900>.
38.
39.
40.

Donalson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 14 at 154.
TSchG, supra note 34, §42.
TSchG, ibid, §42a.
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Moreover, the goal ofthe commission is to effect long-term legal change in
favour of nonhumans, whereas the employment of veterinarians as animal
representatives may reflect the idea that animals should have basic bodily
welfare, rather than social membership. In an important sense, Steven
Wise is a spokesperson for the clients of the Nonhuman Rights Project,
but the Prolocutor's role as I am envisaging it within this agency would be
wider-ranging than Wise's focus on personhood and basic liberty rights.41
In Canada, this broader legal representation of animal interests is a project
of Animal Justice, a non-profit animal advocacy group.42 By seeking-and
gaining-intervener status in cases that involve animal interests, Animal
Justice gives voice to animal interests in legal decisions that affect them.43
Animal Justice, however, relies on charitable donations and the work of
volunteers; I am suggesting that a state that was committed to improving
animal law would create an institutional role for this kind of representation.
3. The Interspecies Relations Board
Labour Boards are another institution that serves as a model for this
proposal. Some scholars, such as Alisdair Cochrane, have argued for
labour rights for nonhuman animals, including the creation of animal trade
unions.44 Even on a fundamental level, there is something to this insight,
in that animals toil for the (usually economic) ends of human beings. "
There are, however, difficulties arising from the fact that it is just not clear
how animal labour can be "organized." In this sense, the matter of animal
work has more to do with employment standards legislation than with
unionization. This is because it is a question of whether there should be
a basic floor of rights, not a question about bargaining power. A further
problem with applying labour law to nonhuman animals is that strikes are
essential to realizing the bargaining power of the union, and these depend
on union democracy in one way or another. In order to apply labour law
(rather than employment standards law) to nonhuman animals, we would
need a way for nonhumans to call a strike.46
Still, there is at least something we can take from labour law, which
is the idea of the tripartite constitution of an administrative agency,
41.
42.
43.

The Nonhuman Rights Project, online: <www.nonhumanrights.org>.
Animal Justice, online: <www.animaljustice.ca>.
Animal Justice has intervened in R v DLW, 2016 SCC 22, [2016] 1 SCR 402 and Vancouver

Aquarium Marine Science Centre v Charbonneau, 2017 BCCA 395; it is currently intervening in

the Vancouver Aquarium's lawsuit against the Vancouver Parks Board's ban on the confinement of
cetaceans in Stanley Park.
44. Alisdair Cochrane, "Labour Rights for Animals" in Robert Garner & Siobhan O'Sullivan, eds,
The PoliticalTurn in Animal Ethics (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016) 15.
45. Kymlicka, supra note 14 at 147-151.
46. Saskatchewan FederationofLabourv Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 at para 54, [2015] 1 SCR 245.
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comprising representatives from opposing interest groups as well as an
impartial chairperson.47 Even if the traditional structures of bargaining
cannot be neatly applied, there is still a bargain to be struck between human
and nonhuman animals. Part of the problem now is that animals have no
say in this bargain at all. This is the reason for constituting the agency in
a way that allows for the representation of both animal and animal-use
interests, through a Board that would include both animal advocates and
animal-use industry representatives, as well as a neutral government chair.
This is the point of looking to labour law interventions as a model
for the proposed agency. There the point is to intervene in the exercise
of common law rights (such as freedom of contract and the masterservant relationship) with a view to promoting social justice. Maybe
more importantly, this happens by restructuring the relationship between
employees and employers. In the labour law context, this is a matter of
adjusting bargaining power, but bargaining is not necessarily relevant in
the human-nonhuman context (and to the extent that it is, it depends on the
intervention of a representative for nonhumans). The problem is not that
animals are currently concluding unfair contracts with industry because of
an inequality in bargaining power which the state could intervene to correct.
They do not have any bargaining power at all, or a meaningful capacity to
bargain. Instead, the bargain has to be altered on their behalf As Daniel
Davison-Vecchione and Kate Pambos have observed, nonhumans need not
be excluded from the social contract just because it is humans who strike
the bargain: they could effectively become third-party beneficiaries of the
social contract.4" Here too there is a parallel with labour law, since workers
are third parties to the contract between their union and their employer.49
III. Transforming Animal Protectionin Nova Scotia
Nova Scotia's Animal ProtectionAct already includes a broad prohibition
on causing or permitting an animal to be in distress." It also lets the
responsible minister make regulations designating activities that will
be deemed to cause an animal to be in distress. 1 A productive way for
the Commission to advance animal protection would be by exercising
power to develop regulations under the act and propose them to the
47.

See, e.g., Trade Union Act, RSNS 1989, c 475, s 16(1).

48. Daniel Davison-Vecchione & Kate Pambos, "Steven M. Wise and the Common Law Case for
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49. Trade Union Act, supra note 47, s41.
50. Animal ProtectionAct, supra note 1, ss 2(1)-21(2).

51.

Ibid, ss 39(1)(ac), 40(1)(n).
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minister. The breadth of the prohibition on causing or permitting an
animal to be in distress would allow the Commission to develop the law
protecting animals by interpreting that provision in respect of situations
not envisaged in the regulations, as well as by defining them in advance
through the regulations. In fact, it is not only the prohibition on causing an
animal to be in distress that calls for interpretation or elaboration. Several
of the provisions in section 2 which specify the meaning of "distress"
contain normative terms like "adequate ventilation," "conditions that are
unsanitary," "undue hardship" and "abused."52 A specialized commission
would be well placed to give concrete meaning to all ofthese terms. Perhaps
most significantly, the exemption from the prohibition on distress applies
to "reasonableand generally accepted practices of animal management,
husbandry or slaughter or an activity exempted by the regulations."53 This
wording puts a great deal of weight on the regulations, and is also open
to a considerable degree of interpretation regarding which practices count
as both generally accepted and reasonable-both terms offering some
potential for progressive application in favour of animals.
1. A regulatoryrolefor the Commission
The tripartite structure of the Commission (including government, animal
users and animal advocates) would make for balanced regulations. It could
take input from industry while avoiding regulatory capture. Currently,
only humans, and generally speaking only industry, have a place at the
table when our relationship with nonhumans is negotiated. Even those
who are supposed to protect animals often stand for human interests. 4
This is why animals need a partisan representative of their own. The
Commission can provide a forum for informed negotiation. Being experts
in both animals and their exploitation, the Commission would be well
placed to make informed decisions. The Commission can attend to animal
capabilities while also making sure human needs are addressed. Often
the Commission might be unanimous-since interests between animals
and exploiters do sometimes converge, as they do between workers and
employers. In situations that call for a tragic choice, the neutrality of the
Commissioner would make this possible.
There is value in including representatives of animal-use industries
because the project is to negotiate a better relationship. Those who are
involved in making the relationship the way it is now should be part of

52. Ibid, ss 2(a)-2(d).
53. Ibid, s 21(4) [emphasis added].
54. Sorenson, supra note 22 at 383, citing House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and
Human Rights, Evidence (17 October 2001).
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the renegotiation: this restorative approach gives a better prospect for
gradual change over the long term. Moreover, it should be remembered
that there are real human interests at stake which need to be accounted
for. These are not just the taste of meat or the feel of fur-as society is
currently organized, matters of health and livelihood also depend on
animal exploitation. It is important to have input on how these needs could
continue to be met as the oppression of animals is phased out. Moreover,
there needs to be some kind of political compromise across the aisle, as it
were, in order for something like the commission to come into being at all.
This brings us back to Nussbaum's notion of the tragic choice. In its
regulatory role, the Commission would have the job of making tragic
choices. A choice can be tragic even when the violation it envisions is not
strictly necessary: it may be politically necessary in the interests of the
broader animal rights movement. Animal advocates may have to make
trade-offs to advance the overall situation of animals. This should not
be understood as a utilitarian calculus, since real entitlements are being
violated. Not everyone can be saved from the war on animals, and this
leaves animal advocates with hard choices.
There are international parallels for such a commission playing a
regulatory role. These include the Tierschutzratin Austria, the National
Animal Welfare Committee in New Zealand (NAWAC), and the Farm
Animal Welfare Committee (FAWC) in the United Kingdom. FAWC is an
advisory committee to the Minister of the Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs.55 NAWAC is a statutory body established under New Zealand's
Animal WelfareAct, which advises the minister in matters affecting animals
except those used in research.56 The National Animal Ethics Advisory
Committee (NAEAC) performs the same role with respect to animals used
in research.5 7 The two committees in New Zealand have an especially
robust regulatory role, in that they are charged with drafting regulations
for consideration by the minister. Peter Sankoff has drawn attention to the
important role of these bodies in promoting public discourse on issues
affecting nonhumans: every year, the detailed "Codes of Welfare" which
NAWAC develops (of which there will eventually be at least twentyone), are subject to revision every ten years, meaning that the committee
will regularly be revising two codes every year in a process that includes
robust public consultation. This means that animal protection is on New

55. "Farm Animal Welfare Committee (FAWC)," GOVUK, online:
govemment/groups/farm-animal-welfare-committee-fawc>.
56.
57.

Animal WelfareAct 1999 (NZ), 1999/142 ss 56, 57.
Ibid, ss 62, 63.

<https://www.gov.uk/

270

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Zealand's legislative agenda at all times, prompting a sustained increase in
the level of public discussion about animal issues."
2. An adjudicative rolefor the Commission
Criminal and civil legal actions aimed at advancing the status of animals
have so far had little success in Canada, but a specialized agency is in a
position to countenance the interests of nonhumans more adequately than
the general courts. 59 The Commission offers a way of getting animal issues
heard which, while falling short of personhood, avoids such problems of
standing as blocked the efforts to have Lucy the elephant saved from her
lonely captivity in Reece v Edmonton." In the system proposed here, the
Prolocutor would be entitled to represent the interests of an animal in such
a case.
Because the criminal law is meant to outlaw only the worst behaviour,
it is not suited to setting new norms of what ought to happen most of
the time. Effective animal protection legislation needs to confront the fact
that violence against animals is widely accepted in society as we know
it. In the human rights context, early experience with criminal and quasicriminal prohibitions on discrimination proved ineffective for some of the
same reasons that the criminal law has not been effective in advancing
animal interests: prosecutors were reluctant to apply it, and even when
it was applied the high standard of proof got in the way.61 Decades ago,
Walter Tamopolsky explained why the cause of anti-discrimination was
better served by persuasion and conciliation than by criminal sanctions, in
terms which, appropriately altered, might make the same case for animal
protection:
[H]uman rights legislation is a recognition that it is not only bigots who
discriminate, but fine "upright, gentlemanly" members of society as well.
It is not so much out of hatred as out of discomfort or inconvenience, or
out of the fear of loss of business, that most people discriminate. As far as
possible, these people should be given an opportunity to re-assess their
attitudes, and to reform themselves, after being given the opportunity of
seeing how much more severe is the injury to the dignity and economic
well-being of others, than their own loss of comfort or convenience.
However, if persuasion and conciliation fails, the law must be upheld,
and the law requires equality of access and equality of opportunity. This

58. Sankoff, supra note 2 at 303-313.
59. Sankoff, ibid at 315-316.
60. Reece v Edmonton (City), 2011 ABCA 238, 335 DLR (4th) 600; see also Katie Sykes & Vaughan
Black, "Don't Think about Elephants: Reece v. City of Edmonton" (2012) 63 UNB U 145.
61. Walter S Tarnopolsky, "The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove: Administration and Enforcement of
Human Rights Legislation in Canada" (1968) 46 Can Bar Rev 565 at 585-586.
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is the "iron hand in the velvet glove."62
Animal protection law would benefit from a similar recognition that
what motivates harm to animals in our society is usually not cruelty: most
of the time, it is "discomfort or inconvenience, or the fear of the loss of
business" that gets in the way of animal-friendly reform. A scheme of
progressive, even restorative, sanctions would promote change in what
is accepted, by helping people to realize "how much more severe is the
injury to the dignity" of nonhuman animals than the "loss of comfort or
convenience." (This is not to assert that every form of animal exploitation
will be amenable to such a clear-cut comparison; nor is it to deny that
criminal law protections for nonhumans should be strengthened, or that the
criminal law should continue to be applied in cases of deliberate cruelty.)
Conclusion
Violence against animals is a massive problem in society as it is currently
structured. Solving it will require large-scale public engagement and the
cooperation of the state. Transitioning away from a society that relies
heavily on animal exploitation will be a long and complex process, and the
state needs to take action in a way that will allow it to supervise and manage
the transition. The state will need to restructure our legal relationship
to nonhumans, and doing this effectively will require extensive public
deliberation. The proposal I have put forward is just one way in which this
could be encouraged; in the largely unregulated field of human-nonhuman
relations in Canada, creative proposals are desperately needed. Instead of
consuming their energy in a never-ending debate between animal welfare
and animal rights, advocates should focus on fostering discussion about
how our society's relationship to animals can change.

62.

Ibidat 572-573.

